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The Criminology of Corruption            
Wim Huisman and Gudrun Vande Walle      
1. Introduction
Corruption is a form of crime. Most people, including scholars, would agree
on that. Criminology is a scientific discipline that has crime as its object of
study. Surprisingly, however, corruption has rarely been the focus of crimi-
nological research and mostly in the context of broader concepts of crime,
such as organized crime. This is rather strange because other concepts are
perfectly suitable for a criminological analysis of corruption. As criminolo-
gists, we are convinced of the added value of a criminological perspective on
corruption. Taking criminology as the reference point we will address two is-
sues in this chapter.
First, several criminological concepts, developed for the study of distinct
forms of crime, will be discussed. These concepts enable a better under-
standing of corruption as a crime phenomenon. Concepts related to corrup-
tion are: organized crime, occupational crime, corporate crime, state crime,
and the more recent derivatives such as state-corporate crime. We end this
analysis with the concept of ‘victimization’ and the added value of victimol-
ogy for a better understanding of the crime phenomenon.
One question that connects the different concepts is the question of defi-
nition. Mainstream criminology generally works within the context of the
criminal law definition. For corruption this usually means the criminalization
of bribing. Bribing has an active side of offering bribes by the ‘corruptor’ and
a passive side of accepting bribes by the ‘corruptee’. From this narrow defi-
nition, an important question emerges when we reflect upon the meaning be-
hind the criminalization of corruption, being the disapproval of the abuse of
power for personal gain: ‘must we use the law to draw the line?’(Nelken
1994). Should the criminological study of corruption be limited to those
forms of corrupt behaviour criminalized by law – mostly offering and ac-
cepting bribes? Or should we extend the scope of research to legal behaviour
that leads to the same sort of abuse of power?
In the second part of this contribution, several theories on the aetiology of
crime will be explored to discover their explanatory value for a better under-
standing of corrupt behaviour. The selection of theories is based on the as-
sumption that corruption is mostly committed by agents operating in the
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context of organizations. A multi-level approach is chosen, exploring possi-
ble causal factors on the macro-level of globalisation and nation states, the
meso-level of organizations and the micro-level of interactions of individuals.
We end this contribution by reflecting upon the methodology that has
been used to study corruption as a crime phenomenon. Empirical research in
criminology is limited and often based on second sources. Some remarkable
research initiatives ought to stimulate further empirical research.
2. Fertile ground for corruption research
The most important concepts that have been host to corruption studies are or-
ganized crime, occupational crime and organisational crime. Organisational
crime is further divided into corporate crime and state crime. Even if the lat-
ter domains retain their authenticity, researchers have crossed the border of
their own domain and are now searching for connections and networks be-
tween organized, corporate, state and occupational crime. This border-crossing
has been introduced by, among others, the criminologists Kramer and Micha-
lowski, with the concepts state-corporate and state-organized crime (2006).
Today more researchers refer to the blurring of boundaries between legal and
illegal organisation and the unreliable employee. This approach starts from
the perspective of the perpetrator. We end this chapter with a reflection on
the contribution of victimology to the understanding of corruption victimisa-
tion.
2.1 Corruption and organized crime
Without any doubt organized crime has been the most important domain in
criminology for research into corruption. This is due to international initia-
tives of criminal policy at the end of the 90s in the fight against organized
crime. Organized crime was perceived as a crime phenomenon that was in-
creasingly threatening the legal economy but it appeared to be impossible for
the police to capture the illegal networks behind organized crime. Money
laundering and corruption were considered as mechanisms used by criminal
organisations to facilitate or to continue their lucrative illegal activities with-
out being detected. Regarding corruption, differences could be made between
corruption on the political level, on the enforcement level or on the level of
administration. These moments of contact between the underworld and the
upperworld gave a clue to the police for further detection of the criminal
network. This idea of the strong link between organized crime and corruption
of the upperworld was later affirmed by the Dutch Parliamentary Inquiry
Committee concerning Investigation Methods, the Van Traa Commission.
The commission said: there is organized crime when – among other require-
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ments – the group is capable of covering up their crimes in a relatively effec-
tive way, particularly by demonstrating their willingness to use physical vio-
lence or to rule out persons by means of corruption (Fijnaut et al. 1998).
What could be called a ‘moral panic’ at the end of the 90s concerning or-
ganized drug trafficking and human trafficking has also had an impact on re-
search in criminology. In the 1960s and 1970s, criminologists created mafia-
like images of criminal organisations: organized crime was an underworld
totally separated from the legal world. Beare refers to the ‘alien conspiracy
notion’ that separated organized crime from normal society and therefore
distanced organized crime from corruption (Beare 1997a: 66). The urgent
demand for more profound research led to a more realistic picture on organ-
ized crime in criminology (see, e.g., Fijnaut 1998; Kleemans 2008; Rider
1997; Ruggiero 1996). Empirically based research such as the Van Traa
Commission succeeded in de-mystifying the mafia-like image of organized
crime in the Netherlands (Fijnaut et al. 1998). Independent academic research
is now deconstructing organized crime in all its complexities, with particular
attention for the moments of interface between the legal and the illegal world
(Fijnaut/Paoli 2004; Van Duyne/Jager/Von Lampe/Newell 2004). Discussing
organized crime is not the same as discussing one concept anymore. Among
other reasons, the variety of organized crime will depend on the ability to
garner support and assistance via corruption. The greater the ability to corrupt
the greater the ability to remain invisible (Beare 1997a: 68). Fijnaut et al.
(1998) see three further relationships of crime with the upperworld: parasiti-
cal, symbiotic and implantation. In a parasitical relationship the contacts with
the legal economy are rather limited and only in the interest of the under-
world. If an opportunity appears, the criminal organisation will try to corrupt.
A symbiotic relationship is more complex, based on the mutual interests of
the criminal organisation and the upperworld. Corruption becomes more im-
portant and gives mutual benefit. However, since the relation between both
worlds is close, corruption is more complex and difficult to prove. The last
kind of relationship type is implantation. The criminal organisation is partly
absorbed in the upperworld and the criminal activities are totally mixed up
with legal business. Corruption changes in a situation of permanent pressure.
The study of organized crime has stimulated attention for corrupt practices:
even if there is no consensus about the necessity of corruption for the continu-
ity of illegal activities, it is obvious that at the very least corruption can be a fa-
cilitator. On a world scale, Buscaglia and Van Dijk found a strong correlation
between the perceived level of organized crime in countries and the level of
perceived corruption in these countries as reported by Transparancy Interna-
tional (Buscaglia/Van Dijk 2003). On the other hand criminologists must be
aware that the connection with illegal organisations is only one specific dimen-
sion. Other dimensions of corruption, committed in the sphere of the legal
economy, are possibly less obvious but may, give to be more reason for the
study of corruption as an independent crime phenomenon.
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2.2 Corruption and white collar crime
A second criminological concept, providing the opportunity for independent
corruption research, is white collar crime. Sutherland, who introduced the
concept during the congress of the American Sociological Society in 1939,
defined white collar crime as ‘crime committed by a person of respectability
or high social status in the course of his occupation’ (Sutherland 1961: 9).
His definition was not very precise but his empirical research made clear that
he was referring to criminal behaviour committed by members of the upper
socio-economic class during their occupation, independent of the fact that an
individual or the company is the beneficiary (Sutherland 1961: 9-10).
Already from that very beginning of what is now called organisational
criminology the definition of white collar crime was a main topic of debate.
The discussion questioned whether it was the role of criminal law to define
white collar crime. Sutherland was convinced of the fact that general criminal
law did not cover all forms of white collar crime because most of the harmful
activities conducted by white collar criminals are dealt with outside the
criminal court by civil litigation or disciplinary rules.
‘Given that ‘upper class’ criminals often operate undetected, that if detected they may not
be prosecuted, and that if prosecuted they may not be convicted the amount of criminally
convicted persons are far from the total population of white collar criminals.’ (Slap-
per/Tombs 1999: 3).
This far reaching statement clashed with the opinion of some lawyers, e.g.
Tappan, who saw in the extension of the definition of crime outside the crimi-
nal law an attack on the principle of innocent until proven guilty. The debate
about the delineation of white collar crime is still going on today. The republi-
can criminologist John Braithwaite, for example, returned to Sutherland’s defi-
nition in saying that the criminal code is at the centre of delineation but most
organisational crime is redefined as a private law conflict (Braithwaite 1984:
6). Some other criminologists rejected the criminal law definition completely
because it is an institution enforced by the state and dominated by the powerful.
These criminologists put forward a human rights definition with social harm as
central point of delineation (Schwendinger/Schwendinger 2001: 84-85). This
definition-debate which had faded through the years pops up again when talk-
ing about corruption. The Global Integrity Report states that the majority of
countries have anti-corruption law: even those countries perceived as vulner-
able for corruption. But when we study the implementation of the corruption
law the results are less optimistic (Global Integrity Index 2008). Even in the
Netherlands and Belgium the amount of corrupt practices which end up in
criminal sentences are limited (Huberts/Nelen 2005: 50; Database Central
Registration of Punishment, Belgium)1 As an alternative to incarceration, the
                                                          
1 Information on the conviction rate of corruption in Belgium was provided by the Federal
Department of Justice.
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case ends with a disciplinary sanction or a dismissal for lack of evidence (Slap-
per/Tombs 1999: 87). The record is even worse for private corruption or cor-
ruption committed between two private individuals. This crime phenomenon
that is considered to have the highest incidence of all corruption phenomena is
often settled in the private sphere or penalised by market mechanisms. For the
years 2004 and 2005 not one case reached a Belgian court (De Bie 2009; see
also: Database Central Registration of Punishment, Belgium).
Despite the immense impact of Sutherlands work on criminology, the
content of white collar crime refused to become clear. Sutherland failed to
distinguish crime committed by an employee in favour of his organisation
with crime committed by an employee in his own interest and against the in-
terests of the organisation. After Sutherland, the concept of white collar
crime fell into disuse and different sub domains were developed: the domain
of ‘offenses committed by individuals for themselves in the course of their
occupations and the offenses of employees against their employers’ (Cli-
nard/Quinney 1973: 188) or alternatively, crime committed by a legal organi-
sation or a member of that organisation in the course of his occupation in fa-
vour of the organisation. The legal organisation that commits crime can be a
private company (corporate crime) or a public organisation (state crime).
2.2.1 Corruption and occupational crime
The concept of occupational crime is relevant when analysing passive cor-
ruption. It means that an employee, in a public or private organisation, has
abused a position of power or trust for private gain and against the interests
of the employer. Clinard and Quinney introduced occupational crime in
‘Criminal behaviour systems: a typology’ (1973). Friedrichs thought that the
definition of Clinard and Quinney made a scientific debate impossible be-
cause the concept was still too broad. He further diversified the concept into
three categories: ‘occupational crime’ referring to illegal and unethical ac-
tivities committed for individual financial gain – or to avoid financial loss –
in the context of a legitimate occupation; ‘occupational deviance’ as the de-
viation from occupational norms (e.g. drinking on the job; sexual harassment)
and ‘workplace crime’ for conventional forms of crime committed in the
workplace (e.g. rape; assault) (Friedrichs 2002). Other researchers who gave
continuity to the work of Clinard and Quinney are, amongst others, Blount
(2003), G. Green (1990) and Mars (2006).
When talking about corruption as a kind of occupational crime some re-
marks are necessary. Firstly, concerning passive corruption, it is certainly the
case that the offender has a personal responsibility but the organisational and
social context cannot be denied. Frequently, it will be a hybrid mixture of on
the one hand the personal characteristics of the corruptee and the impact of
organisational aspects such as organisational structure, organisational culture,
and style of leadership (Mars 2006; Tillman 2009); and on the other hand
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elements external to the organisation such as globalisation, the legal frame-
work and law enforcement (Box 1983: 34-79; Mars 2006; Tillman 2009).
Punch illustrated the complexity of occupational crime in his research on po-
lice corruption. He rejects the bad apple metaphor and focuses more on bad
orchards, an institutional context where the organisation, the kind of work,
and the culture play a key role. In Punch’s work police corruption is viewed
as both individual and institutional failure. Even if corruption, from a certain
perspective, possibly fits the definition of occupational crime, caution is
called for in establishing a causal link (Punch 2000: 314-315; Punch 2009:
18). Gray expressed the same concern for health and safety problems in
companies: while workers are often victims of health and safety problems
they are often too easily portrayed as offenders (Gray 2006). Even if the ini-
tiative emanates from the civil servant, the organisational context often cre-
ates the opportunities to commit corruption. The organizational context as a
causal factor in explaining corruption will be elaborated upon in chapter 3.
A second remark concerning corruption as a form of occupational crime
is that occupational crime may not necessarily be against the interests of the
employer. From the point of view of the corruptee in the case of public cor-
ruption, the organisation can often profit from individual actions, especially if
the company has already participated in a long process of blurring moral
standards. In case of private corruption the interests of the organisation and
the interests of the corruptee correspond. One example is the case of the Bel-
gian soccer club SK Lierse and the Chinese gambler Ye. The bribe that was
paid to some players of SK Lierse guaranteed the continuation of the club,
was a benefit for some players and a guarantee of profit for the gambler.2 In
general, soccer seems prone to corruption (Hill 2009). In practice it is not
easy to make a clear distinction between occupational and corporate crime
and a continuum of activities which favours the organisation more than the
employee or vice versa although the latter occurrence seems to be more re-
presentative.
Occupational crime as a subject of research has been barely studied in
criminology. It could be argued that a previously pro Marxist approach in or-
ganisational crime deflected attention away from the deviant behaviour of
employees (Cools 2009: 192). Another reason could be that organisations try
to hide deviant behaviour of employees in order to avoid negative publicity
or, in the case of a public organisation, to keep their legitimacy.
2.2.2 Corruption and organisational crime
The other part of white collar crime is organisational crime or crime com-
mitted by an organisation or a member of an organisation in the interest of
                                                          
2 Lierse SK ‘naïef’ in omkoopschandaal (Lierse SK ‘naive’ in corruption scandal), Trouw 19
April 2006.
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the organisation. A decade ago every text concerning white collar crime
contained the statement that there is no criminological research on white
collar crime (cf. Pearce/Tombs 1998: ix; Slapper/Tombs 1999: 9). Today, the
domain of organisational crime represents a significant part of criminological
research as a whole and phenomena such as environmental crime, food safety
scandals or financial crime no longer pass unnoticed by organisational crimi-
nologists. This is not the same for corruption. Few organisational criminolo-
gists have studied the act of corruption as an aim in itself.3 This can be ex-
plained in the following ways:
First of all, corruption has always been strongly related to organized
crime and studied as a facilitator of organized crime. It is only recently that
criminologists have given attention to the seriousness of corruption as a
crime phenomenon of the upperworld.
Secondly, and related to the first argument there was no pressure from
‘outside’ to set up corruption research. For a long time politics was indiffe-
rent to the deviant activities of legal organisations and it was certainly not
supported by the private sector who considered the research of organisational
crime as a threat to the free market. It is only during the last two decades that
the attention for public integrity and business ethics has started to grow – also
on the political level. This differs from organized crime which has always
been considered as a threat for the legal economy and has always been taken
seriously by the private sector as well as government.
Thirdly, corruption is an ambiguous concept. We have already mentioned
that the debate about the demarcation of organisational crime is a constant
theme. This is certainly the case for corruption. When leaving the safe legal
framework of bribery and enlarging the definition of corruption to the ‘abuse
of power for private gain’ a new world of insecurity and vagueness is re-
vealed. Perception studies establish a wide range of perceptions on corruption
depending upon the social position of the perceiver and the kind of corruption
committed. Heidenheimer, for example, categorizes corruption according to
social acceptance in white corruption, grey corruption and black corruption
(Heidenheimer 1989). The lack of clear definition of corruption may restrain
criminologists from studying corruption especially since criminologists have
always had difficulties leaving the criminal law borders behind.
Finally, the lack of ‘visible’ victims could be a reason for the lack of in-
terest into corruption as a form of organisational crime. Organisational crimi-
nologists have been traditionally sensitive to scandals and disasters with huge
victimisation rates and serious financial, physical, and emotional impact (Van
de Bunt/Huisman 2007). Even if corruption produces its own human tragedy:
                                                          
3 In 1990 Clinard published ‘Corporate corruption. The abuse of power’. However the title
was misleading since the book is an analysis of unethical and illegal behaviour committed
by the Fortune 500.
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unemployment, lack of health care, school education or famine; it is a slum-
bering problem that is too easily accepted as part of a culture or tradition.
It is possibly the case that there are more reasons to be found for the ne-
glect of corruption in organisational criminology. Nevertheless, the two next
study domains in criminology: corporate crime and state crime, will prove to
be valuable for the study of corruption.
2.2.2.1 Corporate crime
When the criminal law definition of corruption is analysed, it has two main
players: the active corruptor and the passive corruptee. Little attention is
given to the role of corruptor in the media and/or research. We have to agree
with Levi when he says that crime committed by social outsiders is accepted
far less gently than crime committed by the respectable company (Levi 2009:
51). Also in criminology, corruption committed by private companies or the
active corruption side is a neglected crime phenomenon.
The debate on the definition of organisational crime takes on an extra dif-
ficult dimension the moment private companies become the central objects of
research. Sutherland had already illustrated that an organisation is able to
commit white collar crime without being perceived as criminal or without
being detected or prosecuted. One of the explanations for their exclusion
from the definition of crime is the social network of white collar people. The
social network was, according to Sutherland, referable to the cultural homo-
geneity of people working for the government and in business: both being in
the upper strata of the American Society, family and friendship, relations, and
the mechanism of the revolving door. ‘Many persons in government were
previously connected with business firms as executives, attorneys, directors,
or in other capacities’ (1961: 248) Thus the initial cultural homogeneity,
close personal relationships, and power relationships protect businessmen
and women against critical definitions by government. This perception of the
relationship between companies and the political level is something which
fed the idea that companies always escape formal condemnation and that
gave an impulse to the definition debate. This debate is still currently of high
relevance in cases of corruption. While some activities of ‘abuse of power for
private gain’ are considered as corrupt, other activities with the same risk of
harm are considered socially acceptable; for instance networking and lobby-
ing, make the regulator vulnerable for what is called regulatory capture.4 An-
other mechanism that endangers the independent position of the regulator is
‘a revolving door’. A revolving door refers to the mechanism of personnel
shifting between affiliations in politics or regulatory agencies and executive
positions in companies subjected to regulation. In fact people who left their
                                                          
4 In case of regulatory capture the regulating agencies act in favour of those who are regulated
and not for the public interest. The reason for capture is the dominant position of the regu-
lated in the regulation process. This dominant position is the result of a direct or indirect
mechanism of influencing or even manipulation. (See also: Vande Walle 2010).
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job come back in with other interests. The previous network and contacts will
help to protect the interests of the regulated.
In comparing lobbying and corruption Campos and Giovanni have sug-
gested that legal mechanisms such as lobbying are preferred in rich countries
while companies in poor countries have to rely on corruption (Cam-
pos/Giovanni 2006). The promotion of medicines and the subtle interaction
between pharmaceutical companies and physicians is a good illustration of
the distinction between what is legal and what amounts to corruption. While
general practitioners are seduced by pharmaceutical companies offering to
equip their medical cabinets or facilitate participation in a conference with a
luxurious destination they are also encouraged to prescribe new medical
products of that specific company to their patients (Braithwaite 1984; Vande
Walle 2005: 232-240). Despite the recognition of overmedication as a new
western disease, such mechanisms continue to be tolerated.
In the near future more profound criminological research into the corrup-
tive practices of private companies and the acceptability of the relationship
between the private and political level seems to be essential. The initial im-
petus for the latter has already been given with the introduction of the con-
cept known as state-corporate crime; a concept that emphasizes the impor-
tance of both the private company and the state, emerging from the
compilation of the study of corporate crime with the study of state crime.
2.2.2.2 State crime
State crime is a relatively new study domain in criminology. Illegal or devi-
ant acts perpetrated by or with the complicity of state agencies were until re-
cently mostly studied international political sciences and anthropology (P.
Green/Ward 2004: 431). The recent criminological attention has some speci-
fications and challenges for the future. However, with the introduction of the
International Criminal Court, state crime has gained academic attention, also
in criminology.
In line with the competences of the ICC the attention has gone particu-
larly to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (P. Green/Ward
2004; Huisman 2009; Rothe/Ross 2009; Smeulers/Haveman 2008). With the
exception of P. Green and Ward corruption is seldom considered as a state
crime. We think it is a challenge for criminologists to further explore the re-
lation between war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity on the one
hand and corruption on the other, as will also be discussed in section 3 (Ban-
tekas 2006).
Relating corruption to human rights abuses brings the risk of the ‘overex-
posure’ of corruption in countries in transition and third world countries and
makes people think about corruption in terms of ‘the other’ and ‘the self’.
Criminology of the other is a type of criminology which speaks of poor
countries and countries in transition ‘as if they are the gangsters, the rogue
states, the failed states and we can present ourselves as police’ (P. Green/
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Ward 2004). On the other hand criminology of the self considers state crime
as a ‘natural outcome of the economic, military and geopolitical rationalities
of advanced capitalist states’ (P. Green/Ward 2004). This could be a fallacy
when studying corruption and when overstressing the culture of a country or
population. Criminology of the other is possibly an idea which is fostered by
instruments such as Transparency International or the Global Integrity index
which seems to isolate the responsibility for corruption to the government of
the corrupt country while in a global economy more actors are involved. Al-
though Transparency International has attempted to restore the balance by fo-
cusing its 2009 report on corruption into the private sector. In recent years,
companies have gained access to the regulation process and other legal
mechanisms of regulatory capturing have made corruption, in the strict ju-
ridical sense, less important. This evolution into co-regulation risks turning
the attention of the criminologists away from the responsibility of western
countries to poor countries.
To avoid the spurious dichotomy of the self and the other and of the rela-
tion between private companies and the state, a new approach has now be-
come essential.
2.2.2.3 State-corporate crime
A last biotope for the study of corruption is state-corporate crime. State-
corporate crime provides a framework for studying forms of organisational de-
viance created or facilitated by the intersection of political and economic insti-
tutions (Kramer/Michalowski 2006: 18). In the first decades of the study of
corporate crime, criminologists were strongly focussed on the private legal or-
ganisation as the perpetrator and the study of the role of public authorities was
somewhat limited (Kramer/Michalowski/Kauzlarich 2002: 270). In theories
explaining corporate crime, state responsibility was reduced to a lack of state
regulation or a lack of enforcement (Box 1983: 64) or, going back to Suther-
land, was conceived as belonging to the same social class (1961: 248). How-
ever the statement ‘no corporate crime without the state’ holds water. Kramer,
Kauzlarich and Michalowski reintroduced the state as participant in the com-
mission of corporate crime, either as facilitator or as initiator. The introduction
of the notion state came from a feeling of dissatisfaction with the underesti-
mated responsibility of the state in committing corporate and organized crime.
Their critique was based on the proposition of Quinney that ‘the definition and
control of some behaviour as criminal and the selection of others as acceptable
are the consequences of socially embedded processes of naming, not qualities
in resident in the behaviour so named’ (Kramer et al. 2002: 265-266). With the
introduction of state-corporate crime; Kramer and his colleagues reintroduced
the state, not in the baseline as an element of explanation, but as a responsible
actor. Certain behaviour committed at the intersection of corporate and state
goals are not as seen as criminal; either because they are not named as such by
law, or are not treated as such by those who administer and enforce the law, re-
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gardless of the social harm this type of behaviour causes (Kramer et al. 2002).
State-organized crime is organized crime that is created or facilitated at the po-
litical level (Chambliss 1989). P. Green (2005) brought the three domains to-
gether in his study of the construction industry in Turkey and the disasters after
the earth quakes. This same mechanism of the blurring of boundaries between
organized, corporate, and state crime is remarkable in the illegal trade in natural
resources and the relation of this illegal trade with arms trafficking (Boekhout
van Solinge 2008; Reno 2009). A striking example is the scandal of ‘Angola-
gate’ in which French officials have recently been convicted of taking bribes
and doing business with shady arms dealers to safeguard French oil interests in
Angola and in which former executives of the French oil company Elf have
been convicted for offering bribes to both parties in the civil war in this country
(Frynas/Wood 2001).
Kramer and Michalowski further differentiated the responsibility of the
state between state-initiated and state-facilitated (Kramer et al 2002: 271)
notions that fit with what are called acts of commission and acts of omission.
State-initiated activities are socially injurious activities initiated by a gov-
ernmental actor. State-facilitated activities occur when government regula-
tory institutions fail to restrain illegal acts, ‘because of a collusive relation-
ship or because they adhere to shared goals whose attainment would be
hampered by aggressive regulation’ (Kramer et al 2002: 271-272). The cor-
rupt activities of a civil servant in a tolerant environment without leadership
or implementation of regulation could be considered as state-facilitated.5
State-corporate crime is a rather inflexible concept but it sets some re-
flections in motion. Firstly, it has contributed to a more complete view of the
network of responsible actors involved in corporate crime. Not only is the
private company important but also the state, as an institution of rule making
and of enforcement. Secondly, the activities of the state itself are questioned
more thoroughly. Finally, the concept of state-corporate crime highlights the
debate about the criminal law definition of corruption: is the legal definition
sufficient to encompass socially injurious relations between companies? This
is a debate which pops up from time to time in criminology: reminiscent of
the radical criminology of the Schwendingers who pleaded for a human
rights definition of crime because the legalistic definitions cannot be justified
                                                          
5 Even if these different notions of responsibility hold water, their application in practice can
be a rather complex exercise and nuances can be subtle. Take for example the weapons ex-
ported from the Belgian weapon factory Fabrique Nationale de Herstal or in short FN.
Since 1997 the Walloon Region is the 100% owner of the Herstal Group which the FN fac-
tory belongs to. They provide employment for 3000 people in Belgium, Japan, Portugal and
the US. In 2002 FN was front page news because the parliament of the Walloon region gave
permission for the export of more than 5000 machine guns to Nepal whilst weapons export
to regions in conflict is internationally forbidden. What was the Walloon region doing in this
case: facilitating to protect a national traditional economy and employment or, initiating be-
cause they were 100% owners of the company in question? In other words – how do we
categorize a case where the state is the company and the regulator at the same time?
Wim Huisman and Gudrun Vande Walle126
as long as they make the activity of criminologists subservient to the state
(Schwendinger/Schwendinger 1975: 138). In addition, P. Green and Ward
specified the aspect of socially injurious by referring to human rights viola-
tions (P. Green/Ward 2004: 28). Barak moreover, says that in a sense, injuri-
ous activities of the state are more threatening than harmful activities of the
private sector because the state makes the rules in the name of common inter-
est or national welfare (Barak 1991: 5). Even if these contributions are radi-
cal criminological points of view which stand far from practical applicability,
they keep criminologists alive to the relativity of the penal code and potential
injurious effects of legal activities (Passas/Goodwin 2004).
2.3 Corruption in victimology
Corruption can have a wide variety of victims: the state, competing firms, the
community or even entire societies. Moreover, those under direct or indirect
duress to commit corruption offer a broad base for further criminological
analysis. Surprisingly, however, victims are seldom the topic of concern in
corruption studies. This is a general fallacy of organisational criminology.
Corporate crime has often been represented as victimless crime for many rea-
sons (Croall 2001: 8-9; Wells 1994: 26). Ross said it was due to the character
of the perpetrator, the criminaloid, who consciously avoids victimising in his
direct neighbourhood (Ross 1907). Others blame it on the private character of
organisational crime: committed in offices or by using safe telecommunica-
tion. Also, the time-space distance between the offender and the victim plays
a role (Vande Walle 2005: 39-44) Going back to the case of the export of
counterfeit medicines to Nigeria, between the moment of bribing the customs
officer and the consumption of the pseudo-medication a considerable period
of weeks or months passed. Finding the causal link between the injurious ef-
fects and the transaction between company and customs officer was almost
impossible. The distance between the offender and the victim reinforces the
invisibility of victimisation and the unconsciousness of the injured of being a
victim. Furthermore, especially in the case of corruption, the indirect effects
on employment, health care and education, avoids public disapproval. Even if
people were conscious of their victimisation, their social position makes it
almost impossible to react with impact. The Global Corruption Barometer of
Transparency International (2008) shows that low income households have to
pay most bribes. This finding is in flat contradiction to the democratic cha-
racter often attributed to corporate crime. Everybody can be a victim but the
weakest, the poor, the uninformed, are the first victims.
The characteristics of corruption make the victim into what Sutherland
called a weak antagonist, or a victim who resigns because of his low social
status or lack of knowledge (Sutherland 1949: 230). It is one of the tasks of
victimology to make victims more visible primarily, in their own interest but
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also to get a better understanding of the mechanisms which operate to make
people apparently resigned to their fate.
3. The aetiology of corruption
The previous section has shown that criminologists would place corruption in
the scope of types of crime which take place in an organisational context. It is
therefore plausible to explore whether theories that have been developed to
understand the causes of these forms of crime, are also applicable to the aeti-
ology of corruption. In addition, the distinction between organisational and
occupational crime is parallel to the active and passive sides of corruption. In
a corporate crime context, it can be a corporate agent who is offering bribes
in order to achieve a corporate aim, for instance acquiring a contract or ob-
taining a governmental permit. On the passive side, it will be a member of a
private or public organization taking the bribe for his or her own benefit, in
exchange for a service or omission that will probably not be for the benefit of
the organization.
This distinction can also be relevant for the explanation of corruption.
Theories on the causes of organized and white-collar crime are often elabo-
rations of general theories of crime. These theories focus on three categories
of explanatory variables: motivation, opportunity and the operationality of
social control. According to Coleman (1987:409) motives are ‘a set of sym-
bolic constructions defining certain kinds of goals and activities as appropri-
ate and desirable and others as lacking those qualities’. Opportunities entail
‘a potential course of action, made possible by a particular set of social con-
ditions, which has been symbolically incorporated into an actor’s repertoire
of behavioural possibilities’. According to Shover and Bryant (1993: 144)
opportunities for corporate crime are ‘objectively given situations or condi-
tions encountered by corporate personnel that offer attractive potential for en-
riching corporate coffers or furthering other corporate objectives by criminal
means’. The operationality of control is the opposite of opportunity: informal
and formal control provided by guardians serve as a restraint on the commis-
sion of crime (Benson/Simpson 2009). While a motivation is a subjective
construction of psychological desires, and opportunity and control are rooted
in objective social conditions, these variables are inseparably interwoven in
particular settings. Motivations evolve in response to a particular set of
structural opportunities and have little meaning in another context. Equally,
an opportunity requires a symbolic construction making that particular be-
havioural option psychologically available to individual actors. Finally, a
lack of control contributes to the opportunities to commit crime. In other
words, acting in an environment in which business opportunities present
themselves after showing willingness to take care of the personal needs of
authority figures might influence the motivation to do so.
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This example shows that these explanatory variables can be found on sev-
eral aggregate levels: the level of the individual offender and his or her social
interactions, the organizational level of structural and cultural characteristics
of organizations and the institutional level of political economy and business
regulation (Kramer/Michalowski 2006; Shover/Bryant 1993). Vaughan (2002)
has emphasized the importance of understanding the interconnections of the
micro-, meso- and macro-levels and the relationships between the environ-
ment, the organizational setting and the behaviour of individuals within for
the explanation of misconduct committed from within an organizational
context.
3.1 The institutional level
On the macro-level, many criminologists attribute a criminogenic effect to
the ‘culture of competition’, a complex of values and beliefs that is particu-
larly strong in social systems based on industrial capitalism (Coleman
1995:363). In this worldview, the foundations of which can be traced back to
the 17th century (Coleman 1987: 416), great importance is given to achieving
wealth and success, while people are seen as autonomous individuals with
powers of reason and free choice and therefore responsible for their own
condition. In this way, the culture of competition defines the competitive
struggle for personal gain as positive, rather than negative or selfish. Compe-
tition produces maximum economic value for society as a whole. This de-
mand for success and the pursuit of wealth is seen by some criminologists as
criminogenic in itself (Punch 1996). Others point to the fact that it is rather
the flipside that brings a risk: when success is threatened and illegitimate
means are perceived as the only remaining method of attaining wealth (Pas-
sas 1990). According to Coleman, this ‘fear of falling’ is the inevitable cor-
relate of the demand for success, which together provides a set of powerful
symbolic structures central to the motivation of economic behaviour (Cole-
man 1995: 417). Furthermore, the principle of calculated self-interest of mar-
ket exchange collides with principles of open sharing and reciprocal ex-
change found in societies that are not deeply influenced by industrial
capitalism. It is this collision of capitalist self-interest and traditional recipro-
cal exchange which is often related to the observed ‘corruption eruption’ at-
tributed to the internationalization of economic markets (Williams/Beare
1999). The question at hand is whether globalisation of business has in-
creased the prevalence of corruption or has globalisation increased the visi-
bility and sensibility of corruption.
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3.1.1 Globalisation and anomie
Most authors in the field of criminology regard globalisation as a crimino-
genic development. According to Passas (1998), globalisation multiplies,
intensifies and activates ‘criminogenic asymmetries’ that lie at the root of
corporate crime. Passas defines these asymmetries as ‘structural disjunctions,
mismatches and inequalities in the spheres of politics, culture, the economy
and the law’. These are criminogenic in that they offer illegal opportunities,
create motives to use these opportunities and make it possible for offenders to
get away with it. Passas sees corruption as a conservative force that main-
tains or increases asymmetries (Passas 1998: 26). It hampers social, eco-
nomic and political progress and it facilitates the illegal markets which are
the result of asymmetries. Corruption, on the other hand, is also a conse-
quence of asymmetries (Passas 1998: 27). ‘Companies operating in countries
with slow and inefficient administration will be tempted to pay ‘speed
money’ in order to get the job done.’ Economic asymmetries might foster at-
titudes justifying corruption as functional to local economies and as way of
redistributing wealth. Corrupt practices might become seen as patriotic acts,
for instance in skimming off funds of international organisations intended for
economic development.
Criminogenic asymmetries can also be found in the field of the regulation
of corruption. The nature and the firmness of the regulation of corruption
may differ from one country to another, ranging from total absence of bind-
ing standards, to an emphasis on self regulation and criminalization. Al-
though most countries that abide by the Rule of Law have criminalized cor-
ruption and 37 – mostly developed – countries have ratified the 1999 OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, bribes paid in international business are still tax-
deductable in several countries or alternatively, there is a lack of legal en-
forcement, creating ambiguity around the illegitimacy of corruption (Trans-
parancy International 2008). Asymmetries in the regulation of corruption
might not only provide de jure opportunities but they can also contribute to
the moral ambiguity of offering and accepting bribes. Ambiguity surrounding
regulatory requirements and therefore applicable norms and boundaries of
acceptable behaviour is often seen as a typical feature of white-collar crime
(Nelken 1994; Zimring/Johnson 2005).
‘As in the study of white-collar crime, to study corruption is an attempt to follow a moving
target: the way that certain transactions move in and out of acceptable behavior as the
boundaries of what is legitimate are softened, reaffirmed or redrawn; this is the classic stuff
of labeling theory’ (Levi/Nelken, 1996).
Situations in which there is a high degree in uncertainty or confusion as to
what is and what is not acceptable, due to radical changes in society, were la-
beled by the great sociologist Durkheim as ‘anomie’ (Durkheim 1897/1997).
According to Durkheim and the criminologists who have elaborated upon his
theory, in an anomic environment, comparatively high levels of crime might
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be expected. Countries which reputably have high levels of corruption, as
might be deducted from the Transparency Corruption Index, might be in the
process of experiencing such rapid and radical changes. ‘Likewise any sud-
den political or economic shift – such as into free-markets, democratic sys-
tems – may result in a contemporary state of heightened corruption and insta-
bility. The corruption may not be to blame for this chaos, but in fact may be
reflective of it’ (Beare 1997b: 163). An alternative reading of the influence of
globalization on corruption is that it has increased the sensitivity for corrup-
tion. Based on the review of the publications and policy statements of the
leading anti-corruption crusaders – namely the OECD, the IMF and the
World Bank – Williams and Beare (1999) claim that the key change that has
occurred over the past few years is not the growth of overall levels of corrup-
tion or the severity of its effects on domestic economic growth, but rather, the
reframing of corruption as a source of economic risk and uncertainty that
must necessarily be problematized according to the objectives and interests of
the global economy.
It will be discussed below how the anomie can be found on the meso- and
micro-levels within organizations, contributing to causes of corruption. How-
ever, first the relations between nation states and multinational corporations
will be discussed as relevant to the concept understanding of corruption.
3.1.2 Corporations and states
Nation states are responsible for exercising control of corporations by regu-
lating business and enforcing the regulations by actively inspecting compli-
ance and when necessary, sanctioning non-compliance. Corporate crime is
state-facilitated when this social control is lacking; when government regu-
latory agencies fail to restrain deviant business activities. This failure might
be due to negligence, but it might also be an intentional strategy to attract
foreign corporations. As mentioned above, corporate crime might also be ini-
tiated by the state. State-initiated corporate crime occurs when corporations,
employed by the government, engage in organizational crime at the direction,
or with tacit approval of the government.
Corruption can be a causal factor or a result of this nexus of state-
corporate relations leading to deviant behaviour. The concept of state-
corporate crime reflects the fulfilment of mutually agreed objectives of a
public agency and a private entity achieved through cooperative illegal activ-
ity (Friedrichs 2007: 147). The study of state-corporate crime rests on the
premise that on the one hand, in order to operate, the modern corporation re-
quires a particular legal, economic and political infrastructure which is pro-
vided by governments; while on the other hand, governments in capitalist
states depend on corporations to supply goods and services, provide an eco-
nomic base and support government policies (Harper/Israel 1999). ‘A trawl
of literature (largely non-criminological) reveals a great many cases where
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corporations and states have colluded in criminal enterprise for mutual bene-
fit’ (P. Green/Ward 2004: 29)
Corruption might be used as a lubricant, to create situations of depend-
ency of governmental agencies or officials, making them more willing to
serve corporate interests. This might especially be the case when a large
multinational corporation is dealing with a weak government of a developing
country. The desire for development through foreign investment often results
in developing countries ending up dependent on investment by foreign corpo-
rations. This dependence might lead a government to sacrifice the environ-
ment and the human rights of its population to economic development. This
dependence will increase in situations of armed conflict: then the revenues of
foreign investment are needed to keep the war effort going. Dependency on
foreign investment is also strong in countries with a large financial debt, as is
the case in almost all developing countries. According to Barnhizer, ‘the debt
service obligation almost compels governments to look the other way when
foreign and domestic investors offer some hope of increasing economic de-
velopment and hard currency earnings from foreign trade’ (Barnhizer 2001:
146-147).
Furthermore, strong dependence arises in large projects in which the gov-
ernment of a developing country is doing business directly with a large cor-
poration: such as the building of a gas-pipe by the military Junta in Burma
and the US-based corporation Unocal (Marshman 2003) and the Ok Tedi
mining project and Australia’s largest mining corporation Broken Hill Pty in
Papua New Guinea (Harper/Israel 1999). In these cases, governments might
even be willing to change the law so that the operations of this specific cor-
poration is not restricted by regulation that would be violated, while the ac-
tions of its civilians directed against the corporation might be criminalized, as
happened in the Ok Tedi case (Harper/Israel 1999).
Again, bribing might further increase dependencies. Shell has admitted
that their way of doing business stimulated the corruption in Nigeria.6 Also,
while being used by corporations as a means to facilitate smooth business,
profiting from these kickbacks might become the prime motivation for the
business at the receiving end. In the Angolagate scandal it was uncovered
that, via complicated schemes, French officials provided the MPLA govern-
ment with arms that were to be used in its civil war with the rebels of
UNITA. Apparently, these arms were not of very high standard. Sometimes
the arms were just delivered solely for the commission and were directly put
into a tank graveyard because the tanks could not function any more (Shax-
son 2007).
The privileged positions of corporations with exclusive contracts or joint
ventures with state-organs might also lead to strong personal relationships
between corporate executives and politicians or public officials. These per-
                                                          
6 Shell (2003): People and The Environment report.
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sonal relationships may further facilitate corruption. Allegedly, Liberian
president Charles Taylor and Gus Kouwenhoven, director of Liberia’s big-
gest logging companies OTC and RTC had such a relationship. ‘Taylor and
Mr. Gus were close friends’, told the former management-assistant of OTC to
a reporter of the Dutch newspaper Trouw, ‘they often stayed together here on
the complex and played volleyball or went fishing’. The reporter also de-
scribes how these logging companies paid large kickbacks to Taylor and his
accomplices to obtain logging concessions.7 Often, these personal relation-
ships go hand in hand with corruption. The desire to generate foreign ex-
change at an institutional level coincides with the desire of individual politi-
cal and corporate elites to gain personal profit.
In general, a high level of corruption may facilitate harmful business con-
duct, such as human rights violations and environmental pollution (Interna-
tional Council on Human Rights Policy 2009). Due to this causality, Ban-
tekas proposes to qualify corruption as a crime against humanity in these
situations (Bantekas 2006). The countries in which human rights abuses are
frequently committed also score highly on the Corruption Perception Index of
Transparency International (2008).
Corporations will be able to pay off any unfavourable governmental reac-
tion to their harmful business activities. They may also be able to let govern-
mental forces do the dirty work deemed necessary to protect corporate inter-
ests. For example, in Nigeria, a representative of the oil company Chevron
was allegedly seen handing money to governmental soldiers, after having
shot and killed protesters who had occupied one of Chevron’s oil platforms
(P. Green/Ward 2004: 38-39).
Not surprisingly, corporate involvement in human rights violations occurs
in countries with dictatorial political systems. In such a system there is no
democratic control governing the deals that the regime is making with corpo-
rations and the ways in which the government facilitates corporate interest
and the destination of the revenues of such cooperation. Controversially, but
interestingly, Le Billon also points to possible positive effects of corruption in
situations of armed conflict: ‘buying-off’ belligerents can facilitate a transi-
tion to peace (Le Billon 2003; 2008).
The preceding section might create the impression that developing coun-
tries are particularly prone to corruption. However, the public governance
structures of developed industrial societies might also create vulnerabilities
for corruption. An example closer to home (at least the home of one of the
authors) is the so-called Poldermodel that is seen as typical for public gov-
ernance in The Netherlands, and especially in Dutch governmental policies
regarding business. It has an historical meaning and refers to the crucial co-
operation of the inhabitants of the Netherlands (‘the low countries’) to im-
                                                          
7 Arjen van der Ziel, ‘Tropisch hout met bloed eraan’ (Tropical wood stained with blood).
Trouw. 3 september 2003.
The Criminology of Corruption 133
polder’ their land and maintain dikes, in order to keep the water out, other-
wise all would drown. This must have shaped Dutch civil society into resolu-
tion by negotiation and settlement rather than conflict. In the 1990s this
Dutch form of public governance was labelled the Poldermodel (Delsen
2000). It represented the organized cooperation between the Dutch govern-
ment, employers and trade unions, aimed at reaching agreements rather than
conflict (Léonard 2005). The model gained official status by the 1992 report
of the Dutch Social Economic Council (The Economy of Convergence and
Consultation) (Sociaal Economische Raad 1992).
For years this model of public governance was praised, even by the former
president of the United States, Bill Clinton. According to Dutch criminologists,
this famous Poldermodel also has its less desirable side-effects (Van de
Bunt/Huisman 2007). The result is that Dutch governmental bodies are de-
pendent in many ways on the commitment of corporations to realise their goals.
A criminogenic side-effect is an obscure web of shared interests and secret un-
derstandings that can be characterized as ‘collusion’. The small number of
cases of corruption by public authorities in the Netherlands (Huberts/Nelen
2005) may well be related to widespread collusion: it is not even necessary to
bribe enforcers and other public authorities in the Netherlands because they are
already perfectly willing to keep in mind the interests and views of corpora-
tions. The concept was also used as an explanation for the malpractice in the
construction industry that led to a parliamentary inquiry (Van den Heuvel
2003). When a whistle-blower reported on the large scale price-fixing of which
public authorities were the main victims, it was hastily assumed this was due to
bribing practices. However, although some examples of business trips to exotic
locations and attending brothels did occur, these could not explain the wide-
spread nature of overpricing governmental contracts. This was better explained
by the close relations between local officials and construction companies lead-
ing to collusion (Van den Heuvel 2003).
This Dutch example reaffirms the suggestions presented above that more
refined forms of corruption enable developed countries to escape the more
blunt form of bribery found in developing countries (Campos/Giovanni 2006;
Johnston 2005).
3.2 The organizational level
It was discussed above that the strong emphasis placed on the goal of ‘suc-
cess’ typical for the culture of competition found in capitalist societies has
spread through globalisation to the world economy; moreover, situations of
anomie that can occur in societies and that anomic situations are also fuelled
by globalisation. This culture of competition and situations of anomie are of-
ten related to high levels of white-collar crime, such as corruption. A macro
approach, however, cannot fully explain why some corporations or corporate
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agents are willing to bribe foreign officials to get certain contracts, or do-
mestic officials to get certain permits, or to escape sanctioning, while others
do not. The macro perspective does not explain differences in compliance
between organizations and their agents subjected to the same macro-
variables. Therefore, it is necessary to look at organizational characteristics
that may also influence the behaviour of organizational members. ‘Corporate
crime is organizational crime, and explaining it requires an organizational
level of analysis’ (Kramer 1982).
3.2.1 Strain
On the meso-level of organisations, the culture of competition can be related
to organizational crime as a result of the strain that is felt between being able
to achieve goals and having the means to do so. The strain-theory was origi-
nally formulated by Merton as a general theory of crime (Merton 1957). In
his analysis of the American society in the nineteen thirties, Merton argued
that the goal of economic success was valid for all members of society – the
‘American Dream’ – while the cultural prescribed means for achieving these
goals are not evenly distributed among all members and social groups in so-
ciety. This could bring groups with less access to legitimate means for ac-
quiring wealth to search for alternative, possibly illegitimate means, dubbed
by Merton as ‘innovation’. Cloward and Ohlin added to this that also the
availability of illegitimate means may not be evenly distributed among soci-
ety (Cloward/Ohlin 1960). Adolescents growing up in neighbourhoods with
extensive informal economies might have easier access to illegitimate busi-
ness opportunities than youngsters growing up in neighbourhoods without
these criminogenic opportunity structures. While having been developed for
the explanation of crime in the lower classes of society, the strain theory
proved very popular in the explanation of white-collar crime, especially
combined with the notion of anomie (Cohen 1995; Passas 1990). Several
studies have focused on the relevance of strain-situations that can exist within
organizations for understanding white-collar crime. Specifically on the use of
corruption by firms in Russia, Venard (2009) found a positive relationship
between the intensity of competition and the level of corruption.
Especially when opportunities for making profit are threatened and the
continuation of a corporation is at stake, corporate agents might transfer to
illegitimate means to make profit, such as offering bribes to get the necessary
contracts. In their classical and extensive study on corporate crime in Ameri-
can businesses, Clinard and Yeager found that ‘firms in depressed industries
as well as relatively poorly performing firms in all industries tend to violate
the law to a greater extent than those not in this situation’ (1980:129). How-
ever, the application of the strain theory is not restricted to marginal corpora-
tions. First, since all types of organizations are goal-seeking entities, innova-
tive means to achieve goals – besides profit – can be used when conventional
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means are blocked. Corruption as an innovative means to reach organiza-
tional goals – which can be closely connected to personal goals – can there-
fore also be found in non-profit organizations, such as political parties and
NGO’s. Second, it is rather the level of ambition with which goals are set and
the perception that goal attainment is threatened that creates a feeling of
strain than that it is an objectively desperate situation. Even in quite profit-
able and economically healthy firms, strain can be a motive for rule-breaking
when ambitions are set so high that they can only be met by using ‘innova-
tive’ ways. By consolidating the notions of reference groups and relative dep-
rivation, the strain theory could predict rule breaking in any organization, at
every level. In his study on retired managers of large corporations, Clinard
(1983) found that especially middle-managers experienced strain. Top man-
agement sets the goals and the responsibility for achieving these goals is then
passed in the organizational hierarchy to middle managers. Ambitions at the
top may create so much internal pressure that the perceived only possible re-
action of those in the middle is to break ethical and legal rules.
Although lower ranking personnel may be forced to do the dirty work,
such as the actual bribing, they may not be without personal benefit for find-
ing innovative courses of action. Indeed, the attainment of personal goals of
success might be connected to and dependent upon the prosperity of the or-
ganisation. Personal gain may take the form of career advancement, having
stock and receiving personal bonuses. The alignment of personal interests
and organizational goals is not limited to corporations but can be seen in po-
litical organizations as well.
The breach of legal norms can at the same time constitute behaviour
which conforms to the standards and expectations prevalent in the organiza-
tion. ‘Such standards may emerge out of efforts to deal with problematic
situations and structurally generated strains’ (Passas 1990:165). This means
that informal, standard, operating procedures come into being that are clearly
not in accordance with the law, but that are viewed and rationalized as ac-
ceptable and non-criminal, for instance because there are no real victims.
This was exactly the landmark-rationalisation given by a respondent in Geis’
case-study of price-fixing in het heavy electrical equipment industry in the
nineteen fifties: ‘Illegal? May be, but not criminal’ (Geis 2006). The same
rationalization could apply to corrupt standard procedures, as one of the
authors was told in an interview with an executive of the former Dutch avia-
tion industry Fokker: ‘What do you think? If we do not first offer a Fokker
Friendship to the president, we won’t be able to do business in Africa’
(Huisman 1995). Other rationalization in situations in which corruption is
endemic is that one is merely conforming to expectations and that everybody
is doing it. Indeed, in systemic corrupt societies, ‘clientelism’ and patronage
are the norm and not taking part might be seen as deviant behaviour.
These rationalizations lead to a myth of normality surrounding nothing less
than deviant behaviour which has become deeply entrenched in the organiza-
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tional culture and which is passed on to new organizational members. Although
Shover and Hochstetler (2002) warn us of a ‘monolithic bias’ of using organ-
izational culture as an explanation for organizational crime and stress that cul-
ture is no ‘straightjacket for action’, they do point at the evidence that the
stance towards ethical conduct and compliance with the law taken by organiza-
tional leadership may be a critical determent of organizational culture.
The choice for innovative strategies for goal attainment is even easier
when the lines between legitimate and illegitimate behaviour are blurred due
to regulatory obscurity, as might be the case in the regulation of corruption.
The above analysis shows that the relation between strain and anomie is dou-
ble-sided and mutually reinforcing: in anomic situations it is easier to defer to
illegitimate means to achieve otherwise strained goals and strain can contrib-
ute to the blurring of norms of acceptable behaviour, creating deviant sub-
cultures. When it is not clear which rules are applicable, or when such be-
haviour is condoned in the specific subculture, offering or taking bribes will
come to be seen as an acceptable way of achieving organizational or personal
goals. By so doing, this informal norm will become more deeply rooted.
3.2.2 Loosely coupled structures
Besides organizational goals and the pressure put on their attainment, another
organizational feature that has been related to rule-breaking within the or-
ganization is the organizational structure. While the long hierarchical lines of
a classic bureaucratic organization might lead to a diffusion of information
and internal control, facilitating the occurrence of misconduct, deviant be-
haviour has recently been related to the contemporary trend of ‘loose-
coupling’ in organizations. Loose coupling is the answer to increasing un-
certainty in the environment of organizations, partly due to the internationali-
zation of markets, and creates the capacity to respond to changes in the envi-
ronment – threats or opportunities – with greater flexibility. Loose coupling
is a form of decentralization in which sub-units are partly detached from the
parent organization and receive a greater amount of autonomy. Although a
loosely coupled structure allows an organization to better adapt to change, it
also has some dysfunctions which may become an impetus to disreputable
and illegal behaviour (Tombs 1995). A highly divisional, loosely coupled
system may lack internal control. Because of the autonomy of sub-units, ille-
gal behaviour may not come to the attention of the parent’s management.
While this behaviour may be an unwanted side-effect, de-coupling may also
be a deliberate strategy to isolate subunits that run a higher risk of being ac-
cused of disreputable or illegal behaviour, for example because it is operating
in a corruption ridden market or country (Gobert/Punch 2003). Uhlenbruck et
al. (2006) show that corporations that enter foreign markets in corrupt envi-
ronments adapt to the risk of corruption by using equity modes of entry such
as short term contracting and joint ventures.
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A step further in detaching from liability and reputation risks, is out-
sourcing questionable activities. This can often be observed as a corpora-
tion’s reaction to a scandal concerning one of its subsidiaries. For example,
when the large multinational fruit corporation Chiquita had to agree to a plea-
bargain after being accused of providing pay-off money to the AUC in Co-
lombia – a paramilitary group that is on the US terrorist organizations list – it
officially left Colombia. Instead, a new company and independent company
was formed for the export of bananas, Banamex, which has as sole client
Chiquita and used all the infrastructure formally owned by Chiquita (Windsor
2008).
3.3 The interactional level
Although the discussed theories follow the common assumption in organiza-
tional sciences that organizations could be studied as actors, this anthropo-
morphic approach seems to forget that in the end it is people who are offering
or accepting bribes. Most authors in the field of white-collar crime stress that
white-collar offenders are ‘normal’ people, meaning that their personality
traits, demographic and socio-characteristics are more similar to law-abiding
middle-class citizens than offenders of regular, street crime. ‘it is generally
agreed that personal psychology plays no significant role in the genesis of
white-collar crime and that the white-collar criminals are indeed psychologi-
cally normal’ (Coleman 1995). The scarce literature on the profile of white-
collar offenders confirms this view (Weisburd/Waring 2001).
3.3.1 Socialization of deviance
White-collar criminologists emphasize the conditioning effect of the organi-
zation on the individual’s behaviour. Individuals who do not have a deviant
self-image, become offenders through the pressures of the ‘normalization’ of
deviance as discussed above. Organizational sociologists refer to the numb-
ing effects of modern bureaucracies upon the moral sensibilities of their em-
ployees. Drucker labelled this as the ‘Organization man’, who is under pres-
sure to conform to the image that individuality and personal ethical standards
must be scarified for the sake of career. Processes of socialization can create
a kind of ‘moral numbness’, in which unethical or illegal activities appear to
be a normal part of daily routine.
According to Cohen (1995), organizational members who are subjected to
the contradictions between behavioural norms in society and the norms being
transferred in the organizational subculture, might suffer from psychological
anomie. However, one might say that the processes of the socialization of de-
viance offer a way out from this state of alienation. Passas (1990: 166) even
states that: ‘In anomic situations, offenders are in a better position to neutral-
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ise and rationalize their acts, and at the same time preserve their self-esteem’.
Organizational subcultures provide their member with appropriate justifica-
tions. According to Coleman, police subcultures, for instance, often distin-
guish between ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ pay-off money and hold that there is noth-
ing unethical about accepting the former (Coleman 1987).
So, at the interactional level we can see that white-collar deviancy, such
as corruption, is normal learned behaviour. We should thank Sutherland not
only for introducing the concept of white-collar crime, but also for develop-
ing a theory for understanding social learning of deviancy. According to his
differential association theory, criminal behaviour is learned like any other
behaviour and the criminal must learn both the techniques of crime and moti-
vations favourable to criminal behaviour. Through differential association
and techniques, rationalisations and attitudes are passed on.
‘The hypothesis of differential association is that criminal behaviour is learned in associa-
tion with those that define such behaviour favourably and in isolation from those who de-
fine it unfavourably, and that a person in an appropriate situation engages in such behav-
iour if, and only if, the weight of the favourable definitions exceeds the weight of
unfavourable definitions’ (Sutherland 1949: 234).
3.3.2 Neutralization techniques
While there are several forms of corruption, and it could be assumed that
their techniques are not hard to grasp, it might be more interesting to look at
the neutralization of corruption. As white-collar offenders are generally
strongly committed to the central normative structure, every offender has to
cross a moral threshold to be able to violate laws or ethical norms. To main-
tain an identity of being a respectable citizen, a white-collar offender has to
adjust the ‘normative lens’ through which society would view his behaviour.
In their classic study, Sykes and Matza showed that delinquents adjust this
normative lens by using techniques of neutralization that deny the seriousness
of the offence and the blameworthiness of the offender (Sykes/Matza 1957).
As Coleman pointed out so clearly, neutralisation techniques are not only
post hoc rationalizations of white collar crime, but can also precede rule
breaking and thereby morally facilitate non-compliance. ‘A rationalization is
not an after-the-fact excuse that someone invents to justify his or her behav-
iour but an integral part of the actor’s motivation for the act’ (Coleman 1987:
411) This would lead to the assumption that having neutralisation techniques
at one’s disposal is a crucial condition for getting involved in corruption and
being capable of offering or accepting a bribe. Besides the obvious opportu-
nities and limited control mechanisms, these neutralisation techniques could
be an important object of study when doing research on corruption.
In a study on the accounts which convicted white collar offenders used to
justify or excuse their behaviour, Benson identified three general patterns in
accounting strategies: accounts oriented toward the offence, accounts toward
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the offender and accounts toward the denouncer (Benson 1985: 1998). Ac-
counts that focus on the offence either emphasize the normality and general
acceptability of the behaviour (‘business as usual’) or portray the offence as
an aberration, not representative of typical behaviour patterns. When the per-
petrator himself is the subject of the account, he will try to show that no
matter how the offence is eventually characterized, it is not indicative of his
true character. Perpetrators must show that they are ordinary, reasonable in-
dividuals to be seen as separate from their offence and emphasize the crime’s
unique character. Accounts that aim at the denouncer condemn the condemn-
ers. For example, the offender might claim that prosecutors are motivated by
personal interest rather than a desire to defend social or legal values, and that
they were singled out for political reasons that had nothing to do with the
harmfulness of their behaviour.
Both Benson and Coleman constructed a typology of the techniques of
neutralization used by white-collar criminals. Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi
(2005) applied these to corruption in organizations.
One of the most common techniques is the denial of harm. According to
Coleman, the convicted white collar offender frequently claims that their ac-
tions did not harm anyone, and that they therefore did not do anything wrong.
This technique is rather obvious in neutralizing corruption. Although the re-
lationship of the stakeholders in a corruption scheme is often portrayed as a
triangular affair – the one that is bribing, the one that is being bribed and the
victim – the victim is often more difficult to detect. Of course, as discussed in
section 2.3, victimization can always be constructed: competitors who did not
get the contract, refugees who receive less aid because of the amount of kick-
backs taken by local officials, and the integrity of the political system in gen-
eral. However, for both sides benefiting from corruption it will often be easy
to maintain that no harm has been done.
A second neutralisation technique used by white collar offenders is to
claim that the laws they are violating are unnecessary or even unjust. Offend-
ers using this rationalization find support in the influential neo-liberal Chi-
cago school of economics which argues that market systems can only operate
at a maximum efficiency when there no artificial barriers such as government
regulation (Friedman 1962; Posner 1976). ‘The state has no role except to get
out of the way’ (Snider 2000: 182). In the light of corruption this argument is
interesting, because it is due to the pressure of international business that in-
ternational organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and
the European Union are forcing nation states to prohibit and prevent corrup-
tion, trying to create a ‘level-playing-field’ for multinational corporations.
Corporations wish to be able to operate as inexpensively and rationally as
possible throughout the world. Systems of graft and bribes are unpredictable,
unreliable and costly (Williams/Beare 1999). Nevertheless, those who are
struck by these regulations might say that they only promote international
business at the expense of the local economy.
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A third neutralisation is that the violation of regulation is necessary to
achieve vital economic goals or just to survive. Both on the active and the
passive side of corruption this neutralization can be identified. Those who of-
fer bribes will stress that this – however undesirable – is necessary to be able
to conduct business. Those who receive the bribes may say that the regular
salary is not sufficient to survive and that the extra income is necessary to
take care for the family.
A fourth technique of neutralization involves transfer of responsibility
from the offender to a larger group. This will be especially useable when cor-
ruption is endemic. Both those who are offering and who are accepting bribes
might claim that ‘everybody’s doing it’. The accompanying rationalization is
that it is unfair to condemn one violator unless all other violators are con-
demned as well.
The fifth neutralization method is that a person is not responsible for his
behaviour – which therefore cannot be qualified as criminal – when merely
conforming to expectations of others. This refers to the escape of middle-
management to situations of strain: through processes of socialization, using
bribes might be seen as an acceptable way of meeting the targets set by
higher management. Moreover, when clientelism and patronage are endemic,
paying or taking bribes is expected.
Finally, many occupational crimes are justified on the grounds that the of-
fender deserves the money. This rationalization clearly only applies to the re-
ceiving end of corruption, but it might be a dominant neutralization for the
more daily forms of kickbacks that are attached to a certain position in public
office. A good example is the saying used by members of the All Peoples
Congress administration of Sierra Leone, as recorded by Thompson and Pot-
ter (1997: 150), ‘Da sae wey den tie cow, nar dey e go eat grass’ meaning lit-
erally that ‘A cow will graze on land allotted to it for that purpose’.
4. Methodological considerations
A final issue to discuss is the methodology to explore corruption as a crime
phenomenon. It is debatable whether we should discuss a criminological
methodology of the study of corruption. First, in the domain of criminology
empirical research on corruption is very limited. Second, being a social sci-
ence of which the boundary with other social sciences is blurred, research
methodology would also be equally similar. Nevertheless, in criminological
research, methodological strategies have been developed to overcome the
handicaps connected to studying behaviour which people would neither see
nor hear due to its illegal nature (Bijleveld/Nijboer 2003).
Basically, two types of data are used in criminological research to study
crime (and its offenders, its causes and its consequences). The first type is
data produced by law enforcement agencies, such as police reports, court
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rulings etc. The second type consists of data directly gathered from offenders
or victims of crime, mostly by victim surveys and self-reporting surveys.
Corruption is a consensual crime, of which reporting to the police benefits
neither the corruptor nor the corruptee and the victims may be oblivious to
their victimization. Most corruption cases remain hidden because both parties
respect the rule of silence, because nobody in the environment reacts to the
corruption or because their corruptive practices are not perceived to be cor-
ruption. Furthermore, corruption cases that occur in an organisational context
are often settled in alternative ways, such as a disciplinary procedure.
Therefore, corruption is a crime phenomenon with a large ‘dark figure’.
This concept refers to the amount of crime that is not reported and therefore
not visible in official registrations and files. Official data show only the tip of
the iceberg. As a Founding Father of research into white-collar crime, Suth-
erland was aware of the problem that the files of the criminal court only rep-
resent a small part of corruption cases and that most cases were settled out of
court or in a civil or a disciplinary procedure. To study the true amount of le-
gal violation committed by the largest American companies, he collected
both the criminal and civil court files together with databases of disciplinary
agencies. Since only a small amount of cases are dealt with in the criminal
courts the researcher must broaden their research domain to non-judicial en-
forcement organisations. A recent example is the research on corruption in
the Dutch public administration, executed under order of the Ministry of Jus-
tice of The Netherlands (Huberts/Nelen 2005). The aim was to gather infor-
mation on the extent, nature and settlement of corruption cases in that coun-
try. To study the extent of corruption, the researchers started from the idea
that the corruption files at the level of criminal justice are known. They com-
pleted the information by sending a questionnaire to the public administra-
tions asking to report on the files of internal settlement of corruption cases.
The methodology to study the nature of corruption was particularly case-
study research. The settlement question was explored by a triangulation of
conducting interviews and the analysis of files of the public prosecutor and
the public administration.
Every crime, even murder, has its dark figure. But because of its diffuse
character and its apparent victimless nature, the portion below water surface
of the iceberg of corruption will be relatively large even if all law enforce-
ment agencies are included. Victim surveys and self-reporting have been de-
veloped to overcome the dark-figure-problem in studying crime. However,
the limited awareness of corruption victims of being victimized, and the am-
biguous criminalization of many forms of corruption, limit the added value of
these instruments in studying the prevalence and the nature of corruption.
In line with Transparency International some criminologists chose for
perception study (Dormaels 2010; Zang/Cao/Vaughn 2009). Instead of meas-
uring the prevalence of corruption, social scientists developed a methodology
to measure the people’s perception of corruption (see, eg., Gardiner 1967;
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Gibbons 1990; Heidenheimer 1989). These perception studies give an idea of
the way people judge acts of politicians and civil servants. These types of
study primarily shed light on people’s trust in public authorities and proces-
ses of the criminalization of corruption. However, their contribution to crimi-
nological research questions on prevalence and causes of actual acts of cor-
ruption is negligible.
The dark figure of corruption cases makes a quantitative analysis based
on official registration or victim surveys useless. Therefore, most corruption
research in criminology is based on a qualitative methodology: interviewing,
participant observation and case-study. For example, in his research on cor-
porate crime in the pharmaceutical industry, Braithwaite interviewed ma-
nagement and employees of pharmaceutical companies to find out whether
and how companies commit corruption (Braithwaite 1984). A lot of publica-
tions could be read as case-studies even if the methodology is not that rigid.
We refer to the work of Punch on police corruption. His research on police
corruption is based on interviews with police officers and arrested police of-
ficers, on informal talks, on the interaction with police officers during pres-
entations, on visits to police stations etc. (Punch 2009)
The method of case study certainly has its merits. Shover and Hochstetler
(2002) mention that ‘the findings of case-studies can be used to generate hy-
pothesis or to cast doubt on theory-based hypothesis’. Case-studies also en-
able the researcher to study the ‘real thing’, and getting a better understanding
of the meaning of corruption in the social setting in which it is committed.
However, they also point out the shortcomings of explaining organizational
crime on the basis of case-studies. Usually the more serious cases concerning
high-profile individuals or organizations in which they occurred are singled
out, in the process becoming landmark-narratives of scholarship on corrup-
tion. As Shover and Hochstetler remark, findings gained from the most egre-
gious incidents and offenders may have limited application to the more typi-
cal corruption, if such a thing exists. For instance, besides the obvious
example of mafia-ridden countries like Italy, the Dutch perception of corrup-
tion was for a long time shaped by the exceptional case of the bribing scandal
of Prince Bernhard who at the time of the scandal was the husband of the
reigning monarch, Queen Juliana of The Netherlands. The prince was em-
broiled in scandal with the American arms manufacturer Lockheed, in the
process of the procurement of new fighter jets for the Dutch Air Force in the
1970s. The same could be said about the more recent Agusta-scandal in
which two Belgian ministers and the Belgian secretary-general of NATO
were found guilty of being bribed in the acquisition of attack-helicopters
(Cools 2009).
A discrepancy seems to exist between the study of corrupt behaviour of
civil servants or politicians on the one hand and the scientific indifference vis
à vis the corruptive practices of private companies and of civilians. Most re-
search is directed to the passive corruption side while the active corruptor at-
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tracts less attention. Shichor and Geis who carried out a survey on transna-
tional bribery confirm that business men escape the disapproval: people think
that accepting a bribe is worse than offering a bribe (Shichor/Geis 2007). One
of the explanations for this underestimation is that criminologists for a long
time have shown restraint in entering private companies. Indeed, ‘getting a
foot in the door’ is widely recognized as the greatest methodological chal-
lenge of researching corporate crime (Verhage 2009). Once inside, a second
challenge is getting past the socially desirable answers of the public relations
departments and getting managers to talk about the sensitive issues of cor-
ruption. Exceptions in the field of corruption are Venard (2009), who inter-
viewed a mere 552 managers of Russian firms on the issue of environmental
pressures and the decision to adopt corruption, Van de Bunt (1993) who got
corporate security officers in The Netherlands talking about corruption in the
private sector and the already mentioned Braithwaite who linked corruption
to the pharmaceutical industry. One of the recommendations for criminologi-
cal research is to intensify the study of the responsibility of private compa-
nies in corruption cases. The annual Global Corruption Report 2009 of
Transparency International may stimulate research on corruption in the pri-
vate sector.
5. Conclusion
This chapter started with the observation that corruption has seldom been the
topic of criminological research. Nevertheless, corruption is a crime. How-
ever, as shown by the several domains of study in which corruption is of in-
terest, corruption can be both causal factor and side-effect of categories of
crime, such as organized crime, corporate crime and state crime.
Even if these criminological domains are fertile ground for corruption re-
search it has been a rather limited list so far. Generally, corruption is not
studied per se but comes into the picture as a facilitator for organized crime
or a crime phenomenon typical for third world countries. One of the explana-
tions for this scarce attention is the lack of public indignation. Levi gives the
example of the corruption practices of the International Olympic Committee
(Levi 2009: 58). The media who gave some publicity to the case had to pre-
vent being blamed for publicity-seeking incompetence. Illustrating this point,
Box said with reference to his research of police corruption: ‘Corruption
penetrates the public consciousness rarely, like a missed heart-beat in an oth-
erwise perfectly functioning body’ (Box 1983: 93).
Due to the natural evolution of the discipline itself, but also because of
the social context, we predict an increase in criminological corruption re-
search in the near future. First of all, the move to transnational crime research
that discloses the sometimes deviant connection between the western market
and local and national governments of third world countries or countries in
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transition, shows the urgency of corruption research. Secondly, the anti-
corruption measures that have been taken at the international and state level
and the positive pressure that goes out from non-governmental organisations
such as Transparency International have a stimulating effect. Thirdly, actors
in the private sector also start to take initiatives that disturb fair competition.
In the Ethical Corporation magazine corruption is perceived as ‘the’ corpo-
rate crime of the century (Roner 2008). The criminal investigations on the
corrupt practices of Siemens, Statoil and BAE Systems do not pass unno-
ticed. The resistance with which organisational criminologists are confronted
when doing research concerning injurious corporate crime is apparently dis-
appearing.
Finally, we would like to warn against adopting a narrow perspective on
deviant relations between public authorities and the private sector. It is not
only corruption that makes the position of private companies more comfor-
table. The relation between the political level and the private sector has been
changing from a state-regulated market into a policy of co-regulation and de-
regulation. We wonder to what extent corruption is still a necessity for the
protection of companies’ interests and if the danger is not moving to legal
relations between the public authorities and the private sector; in particular,
lobbying, networking and the risk of the revolving doors. The European
commission has recently tried to regulate the market of lobbyists who work at
the European level in Brussels but had to reduce its plans from an obligatory
system of transparency into a voluntary system of openness to the public.8
This chapter has raised the question whether the definition of corruption
should go beyond legal boundaries and include other socially injurious forms
of entanglement of interests. A problem of so doing is the inevitable net-
widening and inflation of the term, further blurring the boundaries between
corrupt and non-corrupt acts. However, not doing so limits the scope of the
criminology of corruption to the usual suspects: the more visible and bare
forms of bribing. Or, as McBarnett has put so eloquently: ‘is corruption a
‘crime for the crooks’ or are some activities ‘whiter than white collar
crime?’’ (Mc Barnett 1991: 3) In the case of the latter, Passas (1998) quali-
fies corruption as ‘crime without law violation’.
The application of criminological theories results in a plausible hypothe-
sis on causations of corruption. This hypothesis illustrates the interplay of
motivation, opportunity and control at the individual, organizational and en-
vironmental levels. This dynamic and mutually reinforcing relationship can
have a spiraling down effect, amplifying deviance and increasing the likeli-
hood of corruption (Den Nieuwenboer/Kaptein 2008).
However, there are two possible flaws in our analysis. First, the many
forms of corruption might challenge the assumption used in this chapter that
it is often committed in a white-collar crime context, and second, this as-
                                                          
8 See for the list of lobbyists: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/transparency/regrin/welcome.do
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sumption and also the hypothesis based on it need to be empirically tested,
therefore. However, there is hardly any criminological research that explicitly
focuses on corruption. Nonetheless, in corporate crime research, some metho-
dology has been developed for studying ambiguous and seemingly victimless
crimes committed in organizational context.
Seeing corruption as forms of organized, occupational or organizational
crime would also suggest that the strategies developed and derived from cau-
sations for combating these forms of crime, would also apply to fighting cor-
ruption. It is noticeable that international and non-governmental organiza-
tions involved in the fight against corruption, often stress the importance of
criminalization and the application of criminal law enforcement. However, it
is questionable if this plea serves as a moral message or as an assumption of
the instrumentality of criminal law. Looking at the responses to organized
and organizational crime, it is generally assumed that the deterrent effect of
criminal law – or any legal sanctions for that matter – is rather limited. While
in theory, total control would deter organizational crime; in practice the de-
terrence strategy suffers from too many flaws to be effective. On the basis of
a meta-analysis of studies of the effectiveness of deterrence of corporate
crime, Simpson concludes:
‘The evidence is far from conclusive regarding whether corporate violators should be
criminally prosecuted or whether other justice systems (civil or administrative) produce
higher levels of corporate compliance or if sanctions should be directed toward the com-
pany, responsible managers, or both (…) ‘Get tough on corporate crime’ recommendations
have relatively little empirical merit at this point of time, especially without consideration
and research on how legal sanctions operate in conjunction with other social control
mechanisms’ (Simpson 2006: 69, 77).
And also the recent studies and policy document on combating organized
crime show a realistic view on the limitations of the effectiveness of the ap-
plication criminal law: ‘You can put them in jail, but you cannot put them out
of business’ (Huisman/Nelen 2007). Because of these limitations, contempo-
rary criminal policy is more focused on taking away the opportunities for
committing criminal offences. Crucial in such situational crime prevention, is
blocking the access of offenders to potential target or victims. However, with
many white-collar crimes, specialized access to corruptees is connected to
occupational roles and blocking this might not be feasible in the organiza-
tional or business setting (Benson/Madensen 2007).
